

M2 DEEQA: Advanced Behavioral and Experimental Economics Syllabus 2018-2019

Summary:

This class will give students from economics an introduction in how questions of central relevance to economists are approached and discussed in other social and behavioral sciences, particularly evolutionary biology, anthropology and political science. The course will consist of an introduction to the history of how economics as a science evolved, especially with respect to other social sciences in the domain of social dynamics. The course will proceed with an evaluation of social group formation, the human family and human « hypersociality », and lastly, origins and consequences of political institutions. As such, the course is designed to provide an overview of social dynamics at multiple scales and levels of complexity.

Teaching team:

The course will be taught by an interdisciplinary team of teachers who are able to provide students with exposure to different methods and topics in the field.

Paul Seabright (TSE/IAST), economist

Jorge Peña (IAST), evolutionary biologist

Ingela Alger (TSE/IAST), economist

Jonathan Stieglitz (IAST), anthropologist

Michael Becher (IAST), political scientist

Requirements:

The course will be taught in English. Students are expected to actively participate in class and to prepare by reading the assigned texts.

Evaluations:

Students will be evaluated on one term paper (e.g. the outline for a research project) and four written take-home exams (one for each part). The term paper grade will represent 40% of the course grade, and each take-home exam, 15%.

Outline:

week 1-2: PART I, Paul Seabright:

- History of economics in relation to the other social sciences: up to the 18th century
- The emergence of economics as a distinct form of social analysis in the 19th and 20th centuries
- The breakdown of the frontiers between economics and other social sciences in the 21st century

week 3 – 5: PART II, Jorge Peña and Ingela Alger: Evolution of social groups and the human family

- Introduction to evolutionary theory (natural selection, mutation, fitness, evolutionary game theory)
- Evolutionary origins of societies (group formation, group transformation, evolution of eusociality, cooperative breeding, kin selection, evolutionary conflict and conflict resolution)
- Evolution of the human family (mating patterns, parental investment, intra-household sharing, Hamilton's rule)

week 6 – 8: PART III, Jonathan Stieglitz: Human uniqueness in comparative perspective

- Life history theory (variation between and within species in profiles of fertility and mortality; reproductive value; life history trade-offs; evolution of post-reproductive lifespan)
- Economic decision-making (patch and prey choice models; marginal value theorem)
- Pair-bond formation and stability (sexual division of labor and complementarity, sexual conflict, mate desertion)

week 9 – 10: PART IV, Michael Becher: (Economic) Origins and consequences of political institutions

- Introduction to analysis of political institutions and political development
- Democracy, redistribution and development
- Origins and stability of democratic and autocratic institutions
- Endogenous electoral systems and their effects

Reading list:

PART I:

(these are intended for reading subsequent to the class by those interested: summaries of the essential points will be given in class).

- History of economics in relation to the other social sciences: up to the 18th century

Herodotus: *Histories*

Ibn Khaldun: *The Muqadimmah*

Bernard Mandeville: *The Fable of the Bees, or Private Vice, Publick Benefits*

Adam Smith: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*

Adam Smith: *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*

- The emergence of economics as a distinct form of social analysis in the 19th and 20th centuries

Robert Heilbroner: *The Worldly Philosophers*

Lionel Robbins: *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science.*

- The breakdown of the frontiers between economics and other social sciences in the 21st century

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson: *Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*

Samuel Bowles & Herb Gintis: *A Cooperative Species*

Diane Coyle: *The Soulful Science*

Sanjit Dhami: *The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis*

Jared Diamond: *Guns, Germs and Steel*

Marion Fourcade: Economics: The View from Below, working paper downloadable from: <https://sjes.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41937-017-0019-2>

James Heckman and Sidharth Moktan: Publishing and Promotion in Economics: the Tyranny of the Top Five, working paper downloadable from:

[https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/Heckman Moktan 2018 tyranny-top-five v3-final-Sept-30.pdf](https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/Heckman_Moktan_2018_tyranny-top-five_v3-final-Sept-30.pdf)

Joseph Henrich: *The Secret of our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating our Species and Making us Smarter*

Paul Seabright: *The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life*

Rafael Wittek, Tom Snijders & Victor Nee: *The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research.*

PART II: EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL GROUPS AND THE HUMAN FAMILY

- Introduction to evolutionary theory (natural selection, mutation, fitness, evolutionary game theory)

Brännström, Å., Johansson, J., & von Festenberg, N. (2013). The hitchhiker's guide to adaptive dynamics. *Games*, 4(3), 304-328.

Broom, M., & Rychtár, J. (2013). *Game-theoretical models in biology*. CRC Press.

Ewens, W. J. (2004). *Mathematical population genetics*. I. Theoretical introduction. *Interdisciplinary applied mathematics*, 27.

Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998). *Evolutionary games and population dynamics*. Cambridge University Press.

Maynard Smith, J. (1982). *Evolution and the Theory of Games*. Cambridge University Press.

Weibull, J. (1995). *Evolutionary game theory*. MIT Press.

- Evolutionary origins of societies (group formation, group transformation, major transitions in individuality, cooperative breeding, kin selection, evolutionary conflict and conflict resolution)

Boomsma, J. J. (2009). Lifetime monogamy and the evolution of eusociality. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences*, 364(1533), 3191-3207.

Bourke, A. F. (2011). *Principles of social evolution*. Oxford University Press.

Bourke, A. F. G. (1999). Colony size, social complexity and reproductive conflict in social insects. *Journal of Evolutionary Biology*, 12(2), 245-257.

Cornwallis, C. K., West, S. A., Davis, K. E., & Griffin, A. S. (2010). Promiscuity and the evolutionary transition to complex societies. *Nature*, 466(7309), 969.

Crespi, B. J., & Yanega, D. (1995). The definition of eusociality. *Behavioral Ecology*, 6(1), 109-115.

Frank, S. A. (2003). Repression of competition and the evolution of cooperation. *Evolution*, 57(4), 693-705.

Giraldeau, L. A., & Caraco, T. (1993). Genetic relatedness and group size in an aggregation economy. *Evolutionary Ecology*, 7(4), 429-438.

Higashi, M., and N. Yamamura. What determines animal group size? Insider-outsider conflict and its resolution. *The American Naturalist* 142, no. 3 (1993): 553-563.

Krause, J., Ruxton, G. D., & Ruxton, G. D. (2002). *Living in groups*. Oxford University Press.

Lehmann, L., & Keller, L. (2006). The evolution of cooperation and altruism—a general framework and a classification of models. *Journal of Evolutionary Biology*, 19(5), 1365-1376.

Maynard Smith, J., & Szathmary, E. (1997). *The major transitions in evolution*. Oxford University Press.

Peña, J. & Nöldeke, G. (2018) Group size effects in social evolution. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 457, 211-220.

Peña, J., Nöldeke, G., & Lehmann, L. (2015) Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 382, 122-136.

Pichugin, Y., Peña, J., Rainey, P., & Traulsen, A. (2017) Fragmentation modes and the evolution of life cycles. *PLOS Computational Biology* 13(11): e1005860.

Powers, S. T., & Lehmann, L. (2017). When is bigger better? The effects of group size on the evolution of helping behaviours. *Biological Reviews*, 92(2), 902-920.

Powers, S. T., & Lehmann, L. (2013). The co-evolution of social institutions, demography, and large-scale human cooperation. *Ecology letters*, 16(11), 1356-1364.

Queller, D. C. (2000) "Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions" *Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B* 355 , 1647-1655.

Queller, D. C., & Strassmann, J. E. (2018). Evolutionary conflict. *Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics*, (0).

Queller, D. C., & Strassmann, J. E. (1998). Kin selection and social insects. *Bioscience*, 48(3), 165-175.

Sachs, J.L. , Mueller, U.G. , Wilcox, T.P. , Bull, J.J. , 2004. The evolution of cooperation. *Q. Rev. Biol.* 79 (2), 135–160 .

Sherman, P. W., Lacey, E. A., Reeve, H. K., & Keller, L. (1995). The eusociality continuum. *Behavioral Ecology*, 6(1), 102-108.

Sibly, R. M. (1983). Optimal group size is unstable. *Animal Behaviour*, 31(3), 947-948.

Taylor, P. D., Wild, G., & Gardner, A. (2007). Direct fitness or inclusive fitness: how shall we model kin selection?. *Journal of Evolutionary Biology*, 20(1), 301-309.

Taylor, P. D., & Frank, S. A. (1996). How to make a kin selection model. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 180(1), 27-37.

West, S. A., Fisher, R. M., Gardner, A., & Kiers, E. T. (2015). Major evolutionary transitions in individuality. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 201421402.

- Evolution of the human family (mating patterns, parental investment, intra-household sharing, Hamilton's rule)

Alger, I., and D. Cox (2013) "The evolution of altruistic preferences: mothers versus fathers," *Review of Economics of the Household*, 11, 421-446.

Alger, I. and J.W. Weibull (2010) "Kinship, Incentives and Evolution," *American Economic Review*, 100, 1725-1758.

Becker, G. S. (1973) "A theory of marriage: Part I" *Journal of Political Economy*, 81(4), 813–846.

Becker, G. S. (1974) "A theory of marriage: Part II" *Journal of Political Economy*, 82(2), S11–S26.

Bergstrom, T. C. (1996) "Economics in a family way," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34, 1903–1934.

Cox, D., and M. Fafchamps (2008) "Extended family and kinship networks: economic insights and evolutionary directions," in *Handbook of Development Economics* edited by T. Paul Schultz and John A. Strauss. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Doepke, M., & Tertilt, M. (2009) "Women's liberation: What's in it for men?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(4), 1541–1591.

Edlund, L., and N.-P. Lagerlöf (2006) "Individual versus parental consent in marriage: implications for intra-household resource allocation and growth," *American Economic Review*, 96(2), 304-307.

Francesconi, M., C. Ghiglino, and M. Perry (2016) "An evolutionary theory of monogamy," *Journal of Economic Theory*.

- Gavrilets, S. (2012) "Human origins and the transition from promiscuity to pair bonding," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 109, 9923-9928.
- Gould, E.D., O. Moav, and A. Simhon (2008) "The mystery of monogamy," *American Economic Review*, 98, 333-57.
- Henrich, J., R. Boyd, and P.J. Richerson (2012) "The puzzle of monogamous marriage," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 367, 657-669.
- Kokko, H., and M. Jennions (2008) "Parental investment, sexual selection and sex ratios," *Journal of Evolutionary Biology*, 21, 919-948.
- Lagerlöf, N.-P. (2005) "Sex, equality, and growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics*, 38, 807-831.
- Lagerlöf, N.-P. (2010) "Pacifying monogamy," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 15, 235-262.
- Moya, C., K. Snopkowski, and R. Sear (2016) "What do men want? Re-examining whether men benefit from higher fertility than is optimal for women," *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B*, 371 (DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2015.0149).
- Robson, A.J. (2001) "The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 39, 11-33.
- Tertilt, M. (2005) "Polygyny, fertility, and savings," *Journal of Political Economy*, 113, 1341-71.

PART III: HUMAN UNIQUENESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

- Life history theory

Emery Thompson M, Jones JH, Pusey AE, Brewer-Marsden S, Goodall J, Marsden D, Matsuzawa T, Nishida T, Reynolds V, and Sugiyama Y. 2007. Aging and fertility patterns in wild chimpanzees provide insights into the evolution of menopause. *Current Biology* 17(24):2150-2156.

Gurven M, and Kaplan H. 2007. Longevity Among Hunter-Gatherers: A Cross-Cultural Examination. *Population and Development Review* 33(2):321-365.

Hamilton WD. 1966. The moulding of senescence by natural selection. *Journal of Theoretical Biology* 12(1):12-45.

Hawkes K, O'Connell J, Blurton Jones N, Alvarez H, and Charnov E. 1998. Grandmothering, menopause, and the evolution of human life histories. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 95:1336 - 1339.

Hill K, Barton M, and Hurtado AM. 2009. The emergence of human uniqueness: characters underlying behavioral modernity. *Evolutionary Anthropology* 18:187-200.

Hill K, and Hurtado A. 1996. *Ache Life History: The Ecology and Demography of a Foraging People*. New York: Aldine.

Hill K, and Kaplan H. 1999. Life history traits in humans: Theory and empirical studies. *Annual Review of Anthropology*:397-430.

Kaplan H. 1997. The evolution of the human life course. In: Wachter K, and Finch C, editors. *Between Zeus and the Salmon: The Biodemography of Aging*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences. p 175 - 211.

Marlowe F. 2000. The patriarch hypothesis. *Human Nature* 11(1):27-42.

Robson AJ, and Kaplan HS. 2003. The evolution of human life expectancy and intelligence in hunter-gatherer economies. *American Economic Review*:150-169.

- Economic decision-making

Bock J. 2002. Learning, life history, and productivity: Children's lives in the Okavango Delta, Botswana. *Human Nature* 13:161 - 197.

Charnov EL. 1976. Optimal foraging, the marginal value theorem. *Theoretical Population Biology* 9(2):129-136.

Gurven M, and Kaplan H. 2006. Determinants of time allocation across the lifespan: A theoretical model and an application to the Machiguenga and Piro of Peru. *Human Nature* 17:1 - 49.

Hill K. 1988. Macronutrient modifications of optimal foraging theory: An approach using indifference curves applied to some modern foragers. *Human Ecology* 16(2):157-197.

Hill K, Kaplan H, Hawkes K, and Hurtado AM. 1987. Foraging decisions among Aché hunter gatherers: New data and implications for optimal foraging models. *Ethology and Sociobiology* 8(1):1-36.

Kramer KL, and Ellison PT. 2010. Pooled energy budgets: Resituating human energy-allocation trade-offs. *Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews* 19(4):136-147.

- Pair-bond formation and stability

Becker G. 1991. *A Treatise on the Family*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Betzig L. 1989. Causes of Conjugal Dissolution: A Cross-cultural Study. *Current Anthropology* 30(5):654-676.

Bird R. 1999. Cooperation and conflict: The behavioral ecology of the sexual division of labor. *Evolutionary Anthropology* 8:65 - 75.

Borgerhoff Mulder M, and Rauch K. 2009. Sexual conflict in humans: Variations and solutions. *Evolutionary Anthropology* 18:201-214.

Flinn M. 1988. Mate guarding in a Caribbean village. *Ethology and Sociobiology* 9:1-28.

Gurven M, Winking J, Kaplan H, Von Rueden C, and McAllister L. 2009. A bioeconomic approach to marriage and the sexual division of labor. *Human Nature* 20(2):151-183.

Parker GA. 2006. Sexual conflict over mating and fertilization: an overview. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 361(1466):235-259.

Stieglitz J, Gurven M, Kaplan H, and Hopfensitz A. 2017. Why household inefficiency? An experimental approach to assess spousal resource distribution preferences in a subsistence population undergoing socioeconomic change. *Evolution and Human Behavior* 38:71-81.

Stieglitz J, Trumble BC, Kaplan H, and Gurven M. 2018. Marital violence and fertility in a relatively egalitarian high-fertility population. *Nature Human Behaviour* 2(8):565-572.

Wood BM, and Marlowe FW. 2013. Household and kin provisioning by Hadza men. *Human Nature* 24(3):280-317.

PART IV: (ECONOMIC) ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

- Introduction to analysis of political institutions and political development

Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15(2): 123-144.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 2000. *Political Economics*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press.

Roger B. Myerson. 1997. "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction." In: *Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications*, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press), pages 46-65.

Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Democracy, redistribution and development

Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, James. A. Robinson. 2014. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality." In: *Handbook of Income Distribution*, Volume 2, pp. 1885-1966. Available from <https://economics.mit.edu/files/10394>

Elizabeth U. Cascio and Ebonya Washington. 2013. "Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129(1): 379-433.

Thomas Fujiwara. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil." *Econometrica* 83(2): 423-464.

Kudamatsu Masayuki. 2012. "Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Micro Data." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 10(6): 1294-1317.

Branco Milanovic. 2000. "The Median Voter Hypothesis, Income Inequality and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Test with the Required Data." *European Journal of Political Economy* 16(3).

Larry Bartels. 2016. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2nd ed.

Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy* 89 (5).

Peter Lindert. 2004. *Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote. 2001. "Why Doesn't the United States Have a European-Style Welfare State?" *Brookings Paper on Economics Activity*, Fall, pp.187-278.

Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, J., and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, James. A. Robinson, 2016. "Democracy Does Cause Growth." Forthcoming. *Journal of Political Economy*.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 2006. "Democracy and Development: The Devil in the Details." *American Economic Review* 96, Papers and Proceedings, 319-324.

Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49.

David Stasavage. 2002. "Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 18(1).

- Origins and stability of democratic and autocratic institutions

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

Carles Boix. 2011. "Democracy, Development and the International System." *American Political Science Review* 105(4).

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson and Pierre Yared. 2009. "Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56(8).

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(4).

Ben Ansell and David Samuels. 2010. "Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach." *Comparative Political Studies*. 43(12): 1543-1574.

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions." *American Economic Review* 91.

James D. Fearon. 2011. "Self-Enforcing Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126: 1661-1708.

Scott Gehlbach, Konstantin Sonin and Milan W. Svobik. 2016. "Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:565-584.

Toke S. Aidt and Raphaël Franck. 2015. "Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832." *Econometrica* 83(2): 505-547.

Paul Castañeda Dower, Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach and Steven Nafziger. 2018. "Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia's Great Reforms." *American Political Science Review* 112(1), 125-147.

Toke S. Aidt and Peter S. Jensen. 2014. "Workers of the world, unite! Franchise extensions and the threat of revolution in Europe, 1820–1938." *European Economic Review* 72: 52-75.

Toke S. Aidt and Peter S. Jensen. 2017. "From Open to Secret Ballot: Vote Buying and Modernization." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(5): 555-593.

Daniel Ziblatt. 2008. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization? A Test of the 'Bread and Democracy' Thesis and the Case of Prussia." *World Politics* 60(4).

Daniel Ziblatt. 2009. "Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany." *American Political Science Review* 103(1).

Isabela Mares. 2015. *From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.

- Endogenous electoral systems and their effects

Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carles Boix. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies." *American Political Science Review* 93(3): 609-624.

Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni. 2010. "Endogenous Constitutions." *Economic Journal* 120(543): 1-39.

Lucas Leeman and Isabela Mares. 2014. "The Adoption of Proportional Representation." *Journal of Politics* 76(2): 461-478.

Gary W. Cox, Jon H. Fiva and Daniel. M. Smith. 2018. "Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation." *Comparative Political Studies*. Forthcoming.

Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101(3): 373-391.

Ronald Rogowski. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41(2): 203-223.

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 1999. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians." *European Economic Review* 43(4-6): 699-735.

Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2006. "Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others." *American Political Science Review* 100(2): 165-181.

Roger B. Myerson. 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game Theoretic Analysis." *Games and Economic Behavior* 5, 118-132.

Roger B. Myerson. 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 87: 856-869.

Patricia Funk and Christina Gathmann. 2013. "How do Electoral Rules Affect Fiscal Policy? Evidence From Cantonal Parliaments, 1890-2000." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11(5):1178-1203.

Stefano Gagliarducci, Tommaso Nannicini and Paolo Naticchioni. 2011. "Electoral Rules and Politicians Behavior: A Micro Test." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 3(3): 144-74.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press.

Daron Acemoglu. 2005. "Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*." *Journal of Economic Literature* 43(4): 1025-1048.

Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Georgy Egorov and Ruben Enikolopov. 2016. "Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan." *Review of Economic Studies* 83(3): 932-968.

Eric C. Chang and Miriam Golden. 2007. "Electoral systems, district magnitude and corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37: 115-137.