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Gender and Networks

This post has been updated on 5th February 2014

Here are two papers from my project with Marie Lalanne.

 

The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs

Abstract:

We investigate gender differences in the impact of social networks on earnings using a dataset of over 22,000 senior executives and non-executive board members of European and US firms. There is a large positive impact on executive men’s remuneration of the number of currently influential individuals they have previously worked with. The impact on executive women’s remuneration is significantly weaker: on average women gain around half the benefit that men gain from larger networks. We use a placebo technique to show that our measures reflect genuine connections and not merely unobserved characteristics.

 

The second paper is joint with Guido Friebel, Marie Lalanne, Bernard Richter and Peter Schwardmann:

Gender Differences in Preferences for Social Interactions

We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in individual choices with respect to social interactions requiring investment (of time or economic resources). The differential selectivity hypothesis predicts that women invest less than men in an interaction with a new partner, other things equal. The differential opportunism hypothesis predicts that women’s investment in a social interaction is less responsive to information about the likely economic payoff to that investment. Both hypotheses, if true, imply important differences in the formation of social networks by women and men. Two cohorts of a total of 363 students were matched randomly over two rounds with a partner to play a trust game. In the second round of the trust game they also had the chance to invite a new partner to play. We find evidence in favor of both hypotheses. In particular, women invest less in new partners in both rounds, and invest even less in a framing treatment that reminds them of the need to reflect on the decision. They also react less elastically to their a priori beliefs about the likely returns to their investment, and to information that is revealed at the beginning of the second round about the return to the amounts sent to their previous partner.

 

Here are the slides from my Gruen Lecture today at the Australian National University in Canberra.

Here is my 2010 paper with Guido Friebel:“Do Women have longer Conversations? Telephone Evidence of Gendered Communication Strategies”, Journal of Economic Psychology, December 2010. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.12.008.

Working Papers

 

  • “The Old Boy Network: Gender Differences in the Impact of Social Networks on Remuneration in Top Executive Jobs”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 689, October 2011, revised September 2012.

    (with Marie Lalanne)
    [ (Download PDF, 541 Ko) ] See the article in The Economist
  • “Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities: Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 669, avril 2011.

    (with Samuele Centorrino, Elodie Djemai, Astrid Hopfensitz and Manfred Milinski)
    [ (Download PDF, 261 Ko) ]
  • “Market Size and Pharmaceutical Innovation”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 670, April 2011.

    (with Pierre Dubois, Olivier de Mouzon and Fiona Scott Morton)
    [ (Download PDF, 251 Ko) ]
  • “Professional Network and Career Coevolution”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 688, 2011.

    (with Nicoletta Berardi)
    [ (Download PDF, 394 Ko) ]
  • “Property Rights, Warfare and the Neolithic Transition”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 654, November 2010.

    (with Robert Rowthorn)
    [ (Download PDF, 355 Ko) ]
  • “The Economics of Passenger Rail Transport: A Survey”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 163, 2003.

    (with Marc Ivaldi)
    [ (Download PDF, 714 Ko) ]
  • “The Economics of Tacit Collusion, IDEI Working Paper, no.186, Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003.

    (with Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole)
    [ (Download PDF, 453 Ko) ]
  • “The Economics of Unilateral Effects”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 222, Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003.

    (with Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole)
    [ (Download PDF, 537 Ko) ]
  • “The Activities of a Monopoly Firm in Adjacent Competitive Markets: Economic Consequences and Implications for Competition Policy”, IDEI Working Paper, no. 132, 2001, Revision 2002.

    (with Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole)
    [ (Download PDF, 141 Ko) ]
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